American
Bar Association
Forum on
the Construction Industry / TIPS Fidelity & Surety
Law
Committee
____________________________________________________
Withstanding
the Tremors: The Golden Rules for a Rock-Solid Design/Build Project
Delivering
Heavy Industrial Projects Through Design-Build: A Focus on Miscellaneous
Procurement Issues
Mark A.
Menghini, Esq.
Greensfelder,
Hemker & Gale, P.C.
January
25, 2007
The Westin
St. Francis,
___________________________________________________________
©
2007 American Bar Association
“DELIVERING HEAVY INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS THROUGH
DESIGN-BUILD:
A FOCUS ON MISCELLANEOUS PROCUREMENT ISSUES”
By: Mark A.
Menghini[i]
Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale, P.C.
______________________________________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on various procurement-oriented
issues associated with “heavy”
construction projects constructed through the use of the design-build delivery
method. For purposes of this paper,.
“heavy” construction is loosely defined as public projects with a construction
budget of at least $100 Million.
Examples of heavy construction might include large roadway, airport and
bridge projects.
Unlike traditional residential or commercial
projects, heavy projects tend to offer wider-range and more complex issues for
the construction attorney to address during front-end contract
negotiation. Note, this is true for
attorneys representing both the public
and private sector, whose clients may be at a disadvantage if their attorney is
not familiar with the peculiarities associated with heavy construction. When considered in the context of the
design-build delivery method, issues associated with heavy construction
projects take on a whole new flavor, as statutory concerns and the likely
involvement (read: impact) of third-parties with the project necessarily arise.
This paper does not pretend to address all of the
pitfalls of contracting in the heavy construction arena. Rather, this paper focuses on only a handful
of issues that often arise which, at a minimum, should be considered by the
construction attorney (and his or her client) during contract negotiation and
consideration of the design-build delivery method. The topics touched upon herein include issues
related to the following subjects:
· Statutory considerations regarding
public use of design-build authorization
and selection criteria;
· Public
Private Partnering (“3 P”) considerations;
· Utility
relocation considerations; and
· Post-award
validation period considerations.
Ultimately, while many of the issues addressed in
this paper are nearly always associated with heavy construction, they may also
have application to smaller, public improvement projects, as well. To that end, it is the hope of this writer
that the points raised in this discussion have cross-over appeal to any
construction attorney practicing in public contracting[ii].
DISCUSSION
I. Statutory
Considerations - Public Use Of Design-Build
A. Can
the Public Agency Use Design-Build or Another Type of Innovative Placement
Method?
The obvious first question that must be asked when
considering an alternative delivery method for a heavy project: Is the public
agency legislatively authorized to utilize the desired alternative contracting
method? Historically, public contracting
has employed the design-bid-build method of construction. However, the use of the design-build process
has become increasingly appealing to public agencies over the last ten years,
especially in the context of heavy projects.
The benefits reaped by public agencies from the use of design-build on
smaller projects are only magnified on projects exceeding $100 Million.
As public agencies become increasingly strapped for
funding, many have sought out alternative means of project delivery in an
effort to reduce project costs. While
this paper focuses on design-build as one of those potential methods, there are
many other types.
The Design-Build Institute of America succinctly
itemizes the following typical benefits of design-build to the public agency: singular
responsibility (single point of responsibility for quality, cost and
schedule adherence), quality assurance (general performance terms
result in the design-builder’s warranty that the actual design documents are
free from error), cost savings (value engineering and
constructability are utilized more efficiently when the designers and
contractors work for the same team), time savings (elimination of
bidding and redesign periods reduces total design/construction time), reduced
administrative burden (no owner coordination between separate design
and construction contracts), early knowledge of cost
(simultaneous estimating during design results in earlier cost forecasts), and risk
management (risk of increased construction costs due to design
errors/omissions is eliminated)[iii].
Based on the foregoing benefits, it is no surprise
that more and more state and federal agencies have adopted statutes which (a)
address the use of design-build and (b) provide guidance for the procurement
and competitive awarding and negotiating of design-build contracts. For example, federal agencies such as the
General Services Administration and Corps of Engineers each employ the use of
design-build for various portions of their work[iv]. By all indications, the use of design-build
by these federal agencies is likely to increase in the coming years. State adoption of design-build legislation
which specifically authorizes and/or encourages the use of design-build
contracting is far from uniform, as many states have yet to enact laws which
clearly promote and guide its use. To
further promote the use of design-build, the
A fifty state survey of
all legislation which addresses design build will quickly demonstrate the wide
disparity between how each state, and indeed each intra-state agency, treats
the use of design-build. While some
states and agencies expressly allow for the use of design-build, others
expressly prohibit its use. Some states
neither expressly allow nor disallow the use of design-build, but have
installed certain statutory ‘roadblocks’ preventing its use. The following sampling of states have enacted
legislation which allows for the use of design-build for projects that may fall
within the category of “heavy construction” – note, this is not an exhaustive
list of states, nor those agencies within each listed state which allow for
design-build:
|
STATE |
AGENCY / AUTHORITY |
CODE |
|
|
All agencies for projects using public funds |
|
|
|
Department of Transportation |
|
|
|
Department of Administration |
|
|
|
Turnpike Authority |
|
|
|
Capital Projects |
MD. Code Ann., State Fin. & Proc. §3-602(g)(1) |
|
|
Department of Transportation |
|
|
|
State Public Works Board |
Nev. Rev. Stat. §341.161 |
|
|
State Transportation Program |
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §228:4(I)(c) |
|
|
Highway Projects |
|
|
|
Department of General Admin |
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §39.10.051 |
Many states not listed above also allow
for the use of design-build, but have enacted statutory provisions which are
either less clear, or pose onerous restrictions on its use. Based upon the wide
disparity in design-build legislation, it is incumbent upon public and private
entities to fully research the applicable statutory provisions before
considering the use of design-build.
B. What Selection Criteria Must the Public
Agency Consider?
Determining whether the applicable public agency is
allowed to consider the use of design-build is only half the battle – the
follow-on question of particular concern to both sides of the equation: What
selection criteria must the public agency consider in awarding the design-build
contract? As in all public contracting,
the purpose of selection criteria for the use of design-build is generally to
allow the public agency to ascertain which design-builder’s proposal ultimately
provides the “best value”. This concept
is sometimes referred to as “best value contracting”.
Unlike the traditional design-bid-build approach,
design-build competitive bidding is necessarily premised upon a more flexible
approach, given the lack of a pre-existing design upon which the bidder can
assemble its bid. The added element of
design unavoidably provides another layer of complexity for both the bidder and
the agency in the evaluation and selection process. The public agency cannot simply compare
‘bottom-line’ numbers in selecting a bid; rather, subjective criteria must be
applied to gauge the qualitative aspects of each individual bidder’s proffered
design.
To ensure best value, federal and state agencies have
enacted a wide variety of selection and evaluation procedures for the appraisal
of design-build proposals. These
statutory procedures range from rigid, conventional competitive bidding to sole
source negotiation based on agency-provided, flexible performance
criteria. The design-build bidder must
be intimately aware of the governing statutory selection criteria in order to
maximize its chances of procuring the contract award. This is especially true for heavy projects,
where the dollar value of construction can quickly escalate (or be reduced) by
the tens of millions of dollars based on the level of creativity in the
design. For instance, where the
governing selection criteria is weighted more toward competitive bid cost
considerations, the design-build contractor may consider alternative designs or
the use of innovative materials in order to further reduce the overall cost of
the project[v]. Conversely, where selection criteria are
weighted more toward factors other than price (such as aesthetics), the
design-build bidder may more comfortably explore creative design options,
knowing that the reviewing agency has more flexibility in selecting a bid which
meets more than minimal cost considerations.
1. Selection
Criteria: Generally
Generally, there are a handful of selection
approaches that federal and state public agencies have adopted for the evaluation
of design-build bids[vi]. These approaches are summarized as follows:
(a) Cost-Weighted Competitive Bidding. Under this approach, the agency is required
to award the contract to the lowest bidder that meets certain ‘responsibility’
standards. To protect the quality of the
end product, the agency sets certain prescriptive specifications on the design
so that responsible bidders meet baseline quality standards in their proposed
design.
Under this approach, the agency places little (or no)
emphasis on factors other than price.
While this selection method may be advantageous for heavy projects that
naturally place less emphasis on design creativity (e.g., large, flat roadway
projects), it may be disastrous from a subjective standpoint for projects where
other factors such as athletes or multiple stakeholder considerations are at
work and the agency wants to encourage design imagination and inventiveness
(e.g., large bridge or mass transit projects).
(b) Higher
Qualification Competitive Bidding. Under this approach, the public agency, while
still placing an emphasis on end price, also bases its selection on greater
pre-qualification standards, such as technical, managerial and financial
capabilities, as well as past-performance and industry reputation. This approach involves more subjectivity in
the bidder pre-qualification process, rather than the ultimate selection of the
design-build proposal. This may result
in the selection agency’s inability to consider higher-cost alternative
designs, despite the fact that those designs may ultimately correspond with
better long-term products. In the
context of heavy projects, though, to a certain extent it may be presumed that
the range of bidding ‘candidates’ is naturally culled simply by virtue of the
magnitude of the project, and the capability of those entities able to
realistically consider the project in the first place.
A variation on this selection process involves the
submission of alternative proposals which deviate from the public agency’s
baseline specifications. This approach
allows the agency to consider design alternatives which would otherwise be
prevented by its narrow design specifications, thereby leading to varied design
alternatives that might result in overall project savings to the public
agency.
(c) Weighted
Award Based On Several Factors. As the name implies, this approach allows the
awarding agency to consider price as but one of several factors in choosing a
proposal. Typically, the public agency
will assign a valve or weight to various factors in the evaluation
process. Because of the sheer size of
these projects, there are multiple considerations other than price alone and
the weighted award method enables the public agency to consider these factors
in the selection process. Federal and
state agencies have adopted several variations on this theme, all of which
employ various degrees of preliminary design prescriptions and place varying degrees of emphasis on factors
other than price. In some instances, the
agency may base its award both on the submission of the bidders’ proposal
packages, as well as post-submittal discussions with the bidders or a “Best and
Final Offer” or “BAFO”. Such
post-submittal discussions may serve to (a) identify potential deficiencies in
the proposed designs and/or (b) provide the agency with additional information
to determine whether it’s technical requirements should be revised. The majority of heavy design-build projects
are based on some version of the awarded “Weighted Award” selection process.
According to the United States Department of
Transportation (Federal Highway Administration),
(d) Sole Source Negotiation. The sole
source negotiation selection process is predominantly a creature of private
sector construction. Under this
approach, a sole design-build contractor is selected for direct negotiations
with the owner, with no consideration of the competitive bid process. It is rare that this approach is utilized in
public works, or that public agencies are even legislatively allowed to
consider the use of this approach, as sole source negotiation naturally lends
itself to the perception of contractor favoritism and potentially higher costs
due to the lack of a competitive atmosphere.
2. Selection
Criteria: Specific Examples –
Prior to submitting an RFP, the transit operator
is required to prepare a set of documents that sets forth the scope of the
project. The documents may include, but are not limited to, the size, type, and
desired design character of the buildings, transit facilities, and site,
performance specifications covering the quality of materials, equipment, and
workmanship, preliminary plans or building layouts, or any other information
deemed necessary to describe adequately the transit operator's needs[ix].
Thereafter, the request for proposal must include a section identifying
and describing (a) all significant factors that the agency reasonably expects
to consider in evaluating proposals, including cost or price and all non-price
related factors, (b) the methodology and rating or weighting scheme that will
be used by the agency in evaluating competitive proposals and specifically
whether proposals will be rated according to numeric or qualitative values, and
(c) the relative importance or weight assigned to each of the factors
identified in the RFP[x]. Note, if
a non-weighted system is used, the agency shall specifically disclose whether
all evaluation factors other than cost or price, when combined, are any of the
following: (i) Significantly more important than cost or price; (ii)
Approximately equal in importance to cost or price, or (iii) Significantly less
important than cost or price[xi].
In
addition to the foregoing, the transit operator is required to establish a
procedure for prequalifying design-build entities, which must include several
factors listed in the statute[xii], including evidence that the members of the
design-build entity have completed, or demonstrated the experience, competency,
capability, and capacity to complete, projects of similar size, scope, or
complexity, and that proposed key personnel have sufficient experience and
training to competently manage and complete the design and construction of the
project.
The criteria used in the evaluation of proposals
may only be that criteria and source selection procedures specifically
identified in the RFP[xiii].
However, the following minimum factors shall collectively represent at
least 50 percent of the total weight or consideration given to all criteria
factors: price, technical expertise, life cycle costs over 15 years or more,
skilled labor force availability, and acceptable safety record[xiv].
1. The preparation of a
design criteria package for the design and construction of the public
construction project.
2. The qualification and
selection of no fewer than three design-build firms as the most qualified,
based on the qualifications, availability, and past work of the firms,
including the partners or members thereof.
3. The criteria,
procedures, and standards for the evaluation of design-build contract proposals
or bids, based on price, technical, and design aspects of the public
construction project, weighted for the project, and
4. The solicitation of competitive proposals,
pursuant to a design criteria package, from those qualified design-build firms
and the evaluation of the responses or bids submitted by those firms based on
the evaluation criteria and procedures established prior to the solicitation of
competitive proposals.[xvi]
II. Public-Private Partnering Considerations
Public-private partnerships, where available,
are another means of delivering heavy projects in the context of
design-build. Public-private
partnerships are contractual agreements formed between public and private
entities that allow for increased private sector participation that goes beyond
the typical requirements of design-build.
The concept itself isn’t particularly new with many of the heavy
construction projects, relying on increased assumption of risk or
responsibilities traditionally shouldered by the public agency. The public entity involved is typically a
state or federal department of transportation, a local county public works
department or a state-chartered authority that is the ‘owner’ of a major
transportation facility (e.g., highway or transit).
Traditionally, private sector participation in
heavy projects was limited to separate design and/or constructions contracts,
based on the agency’s specifications.
However, the emergence of public-private partnerships has expanded the
private sector’s role by allowing public agencies to tap private sector
resources (such as technical, management and financial resources) for the
agency’s achievement of greater cost and schedule certainty, supplementation of
in-house staff, application of innovative technology and access to specialized
expertise[xvii].
In the public-private partnership scenario, the
private entity assumes a greater role in the planning, financing, design,
construction, operation, and maintenance of the heavy project, as opposed to
the traditional design-bid-build or even design-build scenarios. While the private entity may still have
design-build responsibilities, it also takes on the additional roles referenced
above so as to supplement the public agency’s needs.
For heavy projects, particularly Federal
Department of Transportation projects, public-private partnering has been used
to supplement conventional procurement practices by taking additional revenue
sources and mixing a variety of funding sources (including private commercial
debt) as a means of reducing demands on constrained public budgets. Projects that are likely to benefit from
public-private partnerships are those which involve (a) innovative financing
(increased access to private investment to augment scarce resources), (b) tight
schedules (expedited project completion results from grouping multiple
responsibilities in a single contract), and (c) complex design and construction
(increased public access to specialized expertise and proprietary technology).
According to the Federal
Highway Administration, as of August 2006, 21 states and one
III. Utility Relocation Considerations
Significant utility relocations and third-party
permitting issues are a common denominator to many heavy projects, particularly
to transportation construction (roadway and mass transit) where the project
alignment passes through populated and/or older developed areas. When bidding heavy construction, the
design-build contractor must be aware of how these issues will be addressed for
the proposed contract. The design-build
contractor’s role with respect to utility relocations and permitting can differ
drastically from that of the contractor with no design responsibility, as the
added role of designer may provide the contractor with greater flexibility to
take a proactive role in coordinating and addressing the concerns of utilities
and third-party permitting entities through innovative design methods.
While this section
focuses on a utility-related discussion, the same questions posed herein may
also apply to other third parties that impact the project; e.g., state and
county governments / municipalities, local architectural review boards,
concerned citizen groups, etc. The
following offers a brief discussion on several issues that merit examination at
the time of bid by both the design-build bidder and the public agency
owner. In a perfect world, all of the
following issues will be resolved prior to the start of physical construction;
however, the experienced design-build contractor will undoubtedly confirm that
this is not always the case. From a risk
analysis standpoint, it is imperative that the design-build contractor factor
the answers to the following questions into its bid – failure to do so can be
potentially disastrous in the context of a heavy construction project where
invariably the design-builder will be faced with taking into consideration the
satisfying not just the owner but those of various stakeholders.
A. What
statutory authority, if any, is applicable to utility relocations, and how does
this authority affect the project?
It is critical that the public agency owner and
design-builder are well versed in all applicable statutory or local authority
which impacts the relocation of utilities.
There is no uniform statutory treatment of utility relocation issues by
the states, and the statutory provisions that do address utilities range across
the board. While some statutes merely
require that “provisions for utilities” must be included in design-build
criteria bid packages[xix], others require more advance, affirmative
action on the part of the public agency.
For example, under Georgia’s Department of
Transportation design-build statute[xx], design-build construction activities may not
begin on any portion of the project until title to the necessary rights of way
and easements for the construction of that portion of the project have vested
in the state or local governmental entity, and all railroad crossing and
utility agreements have been executed.
For further example,
Colorado’s Transportation design-build statute authorizes the transportation
authority to enter into “project specific utility relocation agreements” with
impacted utilities which may include provisions for (1) the prompt performance
of utility relocation work by either the utility or design-build contractor,
(2) the cooperation of the utility with the design-build contractor and (3) the
timely repayment of funds advanced to the utility for the relocation cost,
including interest that has accrued on those funds[xxi]. Still,
in other states there is no distinguishing a public agency’s responsibility for
certain type of utilities regardless of the procurement process utilized[xxii].
B. Who bears the responsibility for paying
for utility relocation costs?
It is important that all
impacted parties have a clear understanding and agreement as to who will bear
the responsibility for paying for not only the physical utility relocation
costs, but also the associated design of same.
Will the public agency pay for all relocation costs, or will this burden
be borne by the utility in whole or in part?
Will the design-build contractor be responsible for covering utility
relocation construction and/or design costs?
Will it matter if the utilities are reflected in the drawings furnished
by the owner? To the extent possible,
the answers to these questions should be clearly set forth in, and coordinated
between, the design-build and utility contracts.
C. Who will directly contract with the
utilities?
Once responsibility for the costs associated
with utility relocations has been addressed, the public agency owner must
decide whether the utilities will contract directly with the public agency or
the design-build contractor. Many
factors may be relevant to this decision, such as past history between the
affected utilities and the public agency, the availability of agency personnel
to coordinate the effort and budgetary considerations associated with having
the design-build contractor ‘hold’ the utility contracts.
A related question: Who
bears the responsibility for coordination of utility relocations? Will the public agency devote resources to
the coordination of utility relocations, or will the design-build contractor
assume this role? If the design-build
contractor assumes the role of utility coordinator, what contractual ‘powers’
has it been granted vis-à-vis the utilities to effectively keep relocations on
schedule?
D. Have
utility contracts already been executed; and, if so, what contractual
provisions are in place to ‘motivate’ the utilities?
For a design-build contractor that is not
contracting directly with the affected utilities, it is important to know the
status and terms of the public agency’s contract agreements with the utilities,
as each may ultimately have an adverse impact on the project schedule. The first question that must be asked: Has
the public agency entered into all necessary utility agreements prior to the
commencement of project construction? If
the answer to this question is “no”, how will this potentially impact the construction
schedule?
Second, what provisions have been included in
the public agency’s contracts with the utilities to ‘motivate’ timely
relocations? Public agencies that fail
to include sufficient recourse provisions in their utility contracts to penalize
the utilities for late performance (i.e., liquidated damage provisions) are
setting the table for project delays.
Without such penalty provisions, major metropolitan utility companies
are prone to shift relocation priorities over the length of a major project to
satisfy other requirements of the utility companies that are unrelated to the
subject project.
Additional related questions that must be
asked: What oversight and design input will the utility have, has a utility
relocation schedule been developed; and, if so, have the utilities
contractually agreed to the schedule?
Have the utilities begun advance relocation work in conformance with the
schedule?
5. Who
bears the risk of delayed utility relocations?
How does the design-build contract address this risk?
Given the propensity of
utility relocation delays on major transportation projects, it is critical that
the design-build contractor address this risk in its contract with the owner,
particularly in situations where (a) the owner holds the utility contract,
and/or (b) the design-build contractor has no ability to exercise any
coordination or control over utility relocations.
IV. Post-Award
Validation Period
This
section of the paper offers suggestions as to how the parties can equitably
structure the immediate post-award period to enable the successful design-build
contractor to validate certain design assumptions and fill in the ‘gaps’ that
may exist between engineering and construction.
The public agency owner undoubtedly prefers that bid prices remain firm;
however, the very nature of heavy construction lends itself to significant
‘unknowns’ for the design-build contractor that can only be realistically
validated during the post-award period.
For instance, from the contractor’s perspective, it is unrealistic to
expect that all necessary subsurface soil investigations have been performed
during the pre-bid and pre-award periods.
It is simply impractical to expect bidding contractors to have performed,
or even validated, all necessary sub-surface investigations for a project of
any relative magnitude. Likewise, on
larger projects, there is a higher likelihood that certain gaps exist in the
proposed design as a result of scope changes during the bid process, and other
engineering assumptions made during the pre-bid period.
The question arises: How can the owner’s desire
to irrevocably assign risk during the pre-award period be reconciled with the
equities behind allowing design-build bidders sufficient time to validate
design ‘unknowns’? Perhaps the answer is
for the public agency’s request for proposal to include a planned post-award
investigation period, during which the successful bidder will have the
opportunity to validate certain scope and design assumptions. During this post-award period, the successful
bidder’s price would essentially remain ‘open’ while the contractor (a)
performed additional subsurface investigations, (b) analyzed scope changes for
design and cost impact, and (c) performed additional necessary engineering to fill
in other assumption gaps and address other project unknowns discovered during
the post-award period.
At the conclusion of the validation period, the
successful bidder would then be provided the opportunity to assign a value to
items discovered during its post-award investigations for the owner’s
consideration. For all additional
proposed costs, the contractor would be required to demonstrate why such items
were not reasonably identifiable during the pre-award period. In order to avoid abuse of this process, the
owner would be entitled to either accept or reject the design-build
contractor’s ‘final’ proposal, or negotiate an acceptable figure. The benefit of this exercise to the
contractor would be increased confidence that its bid amount reflected all
available information and investigation.
Alternatively, the owner would benefit from the ability to more
effectively foreclose future change requests for additional compensation
arising out of alleged changed conditions that may not have been reasonably
foreseeable during the pre-award period, but should have been ‘caught’ during
the additional post-award validation period[xxiii].
However,
with large heavy projects, arguably there will never be enough investigation
that a contractor can do to completely eliminate risk, especially post-award
where time becomes a critical factor.
As
with a traditional project, the best way for an owner to minimize contractor
contingency for unknowns is to minimize unknowns through information and
preliminary engineering furnished to bidders pre-bid which may include
geotechnical and drainage evaluations, right-of-way maps, inter-agency
cooperative agreements, and other information.
[i] Mark Menghini is an
Officer in the Construction Practice Group of Greensfelder, Hemker & Gale,
P.C.’s
[ii] This paper should not be construed as
providing legal advice regarding any particular issue discussed herein.
[iii]
“Utilizing Competitive Selection”, Design-Build Institute of America; see https://www.dbia.org/pubs/pd-ucs.htm.
[iv] FARS Part 36.3;
[v] “I-15
Named 2002 Outstanding Civil Engineering Achievement” by American Society of
Civil Engineers. http://asce.org/pressroom/news/display-press.cfm?uid=1041.
[vi] For a
more thorough discussion of procurement options, see “Quality Assurance Through
Procurement Methodology”, Nossaman, Guthner Knox & Elliot, LLP
Memorandum, May 11, 2005; Nancy C. Smith; see also, “Utilizing Competitive
Selection”, Design-Build Institute of America; https://www.dbia.org/pubs/pd-ucs.htm.
[vii]
[viii]
[x]
[xi]
[xii]
[xiii]
[xiv]
[xv]
[xvi]
[xvii]
[xviii]
[xix]
[xx] Georgia Code Annotated, §32-2-81(c).
[xxi]
[xxii] See for example California Government Code
Section 4215.
[xxiii] This writer is not aware of any current
statutory authority for this proposed process, and concedes that this process
is currently meant more as a ‘talking point’ than a usable proposal based on
the current status of design-build and competitive bid statutes.